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THIRD PARTY RECORDS PROTECTION ON THE
MODEL OF HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
MARC JONATHAN BLITZ*
Introduction
In his famous dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, Justice
Brandeis warned that as technology advanced, liberty would face new
dangers never imagined by the Framers.1 When the first Congress enacted
the Fourth Amendment, for example, the chief bulwark against government
spying lay in the sanctity of the home—and the Constitution’s ban on
entering it without a warrant.2 By stopping officials from arbitrary
“breaking and entry,” the Fourth Amendment stopped them from gaining
“possession of [a person’s] papers and other articles incident to his private
life.”3 But technology, wrote Brandeis, would likely provide government
spies with another route into an individual’s inner thoughts and intimate
activities. “Ways may some day be developed by which the government,
without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court,
and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate
occurrences of the home.”4
Brandeis was, of course, correct. Secret papers are no longer confined to
the interior of wooden or metal drawers. They now often take the form of
electronic files that can be easily copied, transmitted, stored, or searched en
masse.5 And government officials who want a digital copy are not always
* Professor, Oklahoma City University School of Law; J.D. University of Chicago
(2001); Ph.D. (Political Science) University of Chicago (2001), B.A. Harvard University
(1989). Thanks to Professor Stephen Henderson for organizing this Symposium and to him,
Professor Joseph Thai, and to my fellow Symposium participants—Thomas Crocker,
Andrew Ferguson, Susan Freiwald, David Gray, Christopher Slobogin—for thoughtprovoking discussion about records privacy questions. I am also grateful to Ivaylo Lupov
for valuable research assistance and the Oklahoma Law Review editors for valuable help in
revising this article.
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled in
part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 474.
5. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD
PARTY RECORDS 2 (2013) [hereinafter LEATPR Standards] (“[W]ith the maturation of
digital storage and search technologies, and virtually costless distributions, we now live in a
world of ubiquitous third party information”); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK:
THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 3 (2007) (finding that
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forced to obtain one from an individual’s computer. They can often get the
same information from the many third party entities with whom modern
Americans constantly share such information: the companies that provide
our cell phone service, Internet service, credit cards, or insurance policies.
Even where an individual does not consciously create a record of her
preferences and minute-to-minute choices, an Internet or other technology
company will often create such a record for her.6 Electronic book
companies, for example, keep detailed records of which books an individual
reads, the pages she reads, passages she highlights in each book, and notes
she records in the margin.7 Music and Internet video companies can
likewise generate detailed records of what television shows, movies, or
other media content are watched or listened to on a particular computer—
and for how long and how often.8 In short, as Stephen Henderson writes,
“[W]e now live in a world of ubiquitous third party information,”9
embracing everything from our conversations with friends, to our
encounters with books and other reading materials, to our commercial
transactions.10
The challenge that this state of affairs creates for courts and lawmakers is
even more difficult than Brandeis imagined. When Brandeis insisted the
courts stand ready to protect the “secret drawers” in a person’s home, he
could insist that such legal protection be strong and unyielding. As English
records of transactions with hospitals, banks, stores, schools, and other institutions, usually
found only in file cabinets until the 1980s, are now much more readily obtained with the
advent of computers and the Internet). Individual Standards will be referred to using the
format ‘STANDARD x-x.’
6. See Sara M. Watson, The Latest Smartphones Could Turn Us All into Activity
Hackers, WIRED (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-ofthe-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/
(explaining
how Apple SmartPhones might create records of activity the user is unaware that he or she is
creating).
7. See NICOLE A. OZER & JENNIFER A. LYNCH, PROTECTING READER PRIVACY IN
DIGITAL BOOKS 3 (2010).
8. See Andrew Leonard, How Netflix Is Turning Viewers into Puppets, SALON (Feb. 1,
2013), http://www.salon.com/2013/02/01/how_netflix_is_turning_viewers_into_puppets/ (“Netflix doesn’t know merely what we’re watching, but when, where and with what kind of device
we’re watching. It keeps a record of every time we pause the action—or rewind, or fastforward—and how many of us abandon a show entirely after watching for a few minutes.”); see
also Bill Brennar, Spotify Is a Danger to Privacy Lovers and I Don’t Care, CSO ONLINE (Oct. 6,
2011), http://blogs.csoonline.com/1736/spotify_is_a_danger_to_privacy_lovers_and_i_dont_care.
9. Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment
Third Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 431, 435-36 (2013).
10. Id.
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lawyers have insisted since before the founding of the American republic, a
man’s house is “his castle”11 and a realm that must, in most cases, remain
immune to government entry except where officials have a warrant
supported by probable cause.12 Such a legal barrier against official
investigation cannot, however, plausibly encircle every one of the
numerous records that modern individuals generate in their interactions
with phone companies, financial entities, and other organizations.
Many such records form a critical part of law enforcement
investigation13—often before police can obtain the probable cause they
need to conduct more intrusive searches, such as the search of a home or a
wiretap. Police may be tipped off to the possibility of criminal activity, for
example, by an unusual pattern of travel movements or financial
transactions.14 If such information were as strongly walled off from police
examination as the details of in-home activity, law enforcement
investigations might rarely get off the ground. Fourth Amendment privacy
protection accorded to the home tends to be invariable—treating “all
details” as “intimate details.”15 By contrast, this probably cannot be true of
the privacy protection that lawmakers give to diverse records of individual
activity. Such records protection has to vary, based upon the types of
records involved or on other circumstances that affect individuals’
expectations about the records’ privacy or their likely importance in law
enforcement investigations.
Moreover, such a nuanced scheme for records privacy cannot be found in
contemporary Fourth Amendment law. While the Court has squarely
addressed the challenge of adapting the Fourth Amendment to

11. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 945 (7th Cir. 2012) (Williams, J., dissenting)
(noting that the seventeenth century English jurist Lord Edward Coke explained that “a
man’s home was his castle”); Comer v. Warden, Ohio State Penitentiary, No. 2:13-CV-0003,
2013 WL 1721126, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 22, 2013) (noting that “[t]he maxim that a man’s
home is ‘his castle’ has deep roots in English law . . . [and] has long been a cherished part of
American law”).
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause . . . .”); Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“It is a ‘basic
principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a
warrant are presumptively unreasonable.’” (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559
(2004))).
13. See STANDARD 25-3.2 commentary (“‘[R]ecords searches’—in which law
enforcement obtains evidence of crime via records maintained by institutional third parties—
are surely one of the most important investigatory activities.”).
14. Id.
15. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (emphasis omitted).
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technological invasions of the home,16 it has not taken the same approach to
the challenge of protecting “secret papers” generated and stored outside the
home. Rather, under its “third party doctrine,” the Court has found that
when we share records with third parties, we “assume the risk” those
records might then be passed onto government officials (whether
voluntarily or in response to a subpoena).17 In short, under the third party
doctrine, government is not barred by the Fourth Amendment from
obtaining information we have put within its reach by sharing it with
business entities (such as banks or phone companies).
Of course, legislators are free to fill the gap that the Court left in this
aspect of its Fourth Amendment law—they can take up the challenge of
protecting the records that the Court’s Fourth Amendment law has left
unprotected. If and when they do, they will find an invaluable template in
the American Bar Association’s new Standards for Law Enforcement
Access to Third Party Records (LEATPR Standards). The centerpiece of
these standards is a tiered system of privacy protection that directly
addresses the complexity just discussed, whereby different records must be
given distinctive levels of protection. In short, the LEATPR Standards
advise that lawmakers should strive to categorize each set of records
according to their “degree of privacy,”18 classifying them as “highly
private,” “moderately private,” “minimally private,” or “not private.”19
Once a set of records receives a category designation, a corresponding level
of protection then follows. Only records in the highest tier of privacy
receive a level of protection akin to that which the Fourth Amendment
establishes for wiretaps or searches of the home: namely, the requirement
that police receive a court order based upon probable cause.20 Access to
moderately private records, by contrast, should require a court order based
only upon reasonable suspicion (or in some cases, an even lower threshold
of suspicion).21 Minimally private records should be accessible to police
16. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting
that the majority opinion in Berger “overrules sub silentio Olmstead v. United States, and its
offspring, and brings wiretapping and other electronic eavesdropping fully within the
purview of the Fourth Amendment” (internal citations omitted)); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
17. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1976) (noting that telephone subscribers
realize that the phone company has technology and reasons to record their calls); see also
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (holding that a bank depositor could not
expect that his financial records would retain their privacy once he shared them with a bank).
18. See LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 5, at 10.
19. Id.; see also STANDARD 25-4.1; STANDARD 25-4.2 (emphasis omitted).
20. STANDARD 25-5.3.
21. Id.
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without the approval of the courts at all, as long as a prosecutor or other
agency official has some basis for believing the records have relevance to
the law enforcement effort for which they are sought.22 And records that
are not private should be available at any time to police pursuing a
“legitimate law enforcement purpose.”23
This system has a number of advantages as a template for legislatures
and agencies. By designing a system whereby law enforcement’s path of
least resistance leads them to initially non-private or minimally private
records, the Standards help encourage law enforcement practices in which
officials refrain (where possible) from too hastily intruding into records
about the more intimate areas of life. They also provide guidance on how
lawmakers should assign types of records to different tiers—about what
factors might help them tell if a record should be classified as “highly” or
“moderately” private and receive its attendant protections, or remain
accessible to police even without a court order.
Here, however, the Standards meet the challenge of providing nuance,
and do so too successfully. As the Standards themselves note, apart from a
few paradigmatic cases of private information, such as medical records,
“there are few bright lines in privacy.”24 Information that might seem
“highly private” to one person, might seem “minimally private” to
another—and while the Standards’ factors provide a way to begin
addressing the classification challenge in an orderly fashion, the same
individuals who disagree in their intuitions about privacy are likely to differ
in how they apply the factors, and with what results.
This article therefore proposes a rethinking of the Standards’ set of
factors. It proposes modeling it on another familiar framework which, like
the Standards, aims at “striking” a “delicate balance” between government
power and individual freedom25—between the need for government to
regulate and the need for individuals to continue to have insulated spaces,
in the midst of such regulation, in which they are largely free to organize
their own lives in their own way. More specifically, the model that strikes
this balance in constitutional law consists of requiring the government to
meet tiers of scrutiny—“strict scrutiny” where the individual liberty interest
is strongest, “minimal scrutiny” (or “rational basis”) where it is weakest and
the government therefore most free to regulate, and “intermediate scrutiny”
for the territory in between where the need for liberty and the need for
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
STANDARD 25-4.1 commentary.
United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 247 (3d Cir. 2008) (Cowen, J., dissenting).
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regulation are of comparable strength (or the balance is, at least initially,
largely unclear).26
In some respects, the Standards’ own system of tiers closely resembles
the courts’ system of tiers for protecting liberties in constitutional law.
However, there are important differences, and my central thesis in this
article is that, while the Standards cannot and should not simply adopt the
constitutional scrutiny unchanged, or simply substitute it for their own
(justifiable) category choices, they can benefit by borrowing from the
scrutiny-based system in certain ways.
One respect in which heightened scrutiny provides a model is that courts
do not, as a general matter, use a complex multifactor test to divide the
realm of strict scrutiny from that of intermediate and minimal scrutiny.27
The dividing lines, while in some cases certainly contestable, are clearer
than that. They cannot be identical to the lines that divide up our
informational lives, but they can provide a model.28 We might, for
example, begin in privacy law as courts do in cases applying judicial
scrutiny to laws limiting individual liberties, by most strongly insulating the
realms of life over which the government has the least business exercising
control—the realms where we form or exchange our opinions and where we
engage in intimate activities. Traditions and norms of privacy may then
move these initial lines—giving the government greater power to monitor
realms of communication, and perhaps lesser power, in some cases, to
regulate the financial or physical realm where government normally has a
greater role to play in assuring safety and market fairness. But the starting
point, at least, is clearer than a set of factors that different audiences will
interpret in very different ways.
There is also a second benefit to treating heightened scrutiny as a model:
not only would it help legislators, courts, and agencies to better apply the
Standards’ tiers of privacy, it would also help lawmakers to refine—and
make more practicable—the corresponding tiers of protection. The
Standards currently take account of this law enforcement interest chiefly by
making it clear that officials are able to gain access to records of any kind,
as long as they meet whatever standard of suspicion corresponds to the
records’ privacy: probable cause for highly private records, reasonable

26. See generally 1 WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11:3 (3d ed.
2013).
27. See infra notes 130-133 and accompanying text.
28. See infra Part II.
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suspicion for moderately protected records, relevance for minimally private
records, and no burden at all for records that are not private.29
These four tiers of protection, taken alone, however, do not take
adequate account of the possibility that law enforcement may sometimes
need to obtain even highly or moderately private information more easily
than the Standards permit. So the Standards also suggest, at various points,
that the hurdles facing law enforcement may be lowered even further. They
may be lowered, for example, to meet an emergency,30 or, more generally,
in any situation where the burden imposed by their multi-tier privacy
protection system “would render law enforcement unable to solve or
prevent an unacceptable amount of otherwise solvable or preventable
crime.”31
But such a provision offers little guidance. It simply emphasizes that
there may be times when legislators will be reasonable in setting aside the
guidance given in the Standards’ multi-tier protection system. While it is
probably impossible to completely specify ahead of time exactly when and
where law enforcement will face challenges that require faster and more
data analysis than the Standards allow, it is better to try to identify and
more carefully define those circumstances, instead of simply including a
general escape hatch that may well grow into an exception that swallows
the Standards’ earlier rules.
Again, the model of heightened scrutiny suggests a valuable corrective.
Under strict scrutiny in First Amendment cases, for example, even where
government has a sufficiently compelling need to limit speech, it must still
adopt a “narrowly tailored” means of imposing such a limit.32 Applied to
the realm of records protection, such a model would require not only that
law enforcement show that they have a genuine need for quick access to
certain records, but that they will satisfy this need in a way that avoids
unnecessary damage to individuals’ privacy interests.
Part I elaborates on the value of the four-tier privacy categorization
scheme in the LEATPR. While some are likely to criticize these Standards
as being insufficiently nuanced, this Part argues that simplification in this
case is probably valuable and unavoidable. Part II next draws on First
Amendment law and other areas where the court uses heightened scrutiny
29. STANDARD 25-5.3.
30. STANDARD 25-5.4.
31. STANDARD 25-4.2.
32. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2817
(2011) (noting that laws burdening political speech must not only meet a compelling interest
but also must be “narrowly tailored” to achieve that interest).
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to rethink the Standards’ four-factor analysis for assigning types of records
to tiers of privacy. Part III then turns from the Standards’ tiers of privacy to
its tiers of protection. This part examines how this system of protection
might be refined by incorporating elements of the scrutiny-based
classification scheme one finds in First Amendment case law, and its
similarity with the minimization requirements (or factors) one finds
respectively in wiretapping and special needs jurisprudence.
I. Tiers of Privacy and the Need for Simplification
Any attempt to divide our activities into four tiers of privacy will
inevitably simplify a complex world. Individuals’ intuitions about degrees
of privacy will often be more nuanced, allowing them, for example, to find
some “moderately private” records more sensitive (and potentially
embarrassing) than other “moderately private” records. Moreover, different
individuals will sometimes have starkly different judgments about what
kinds of activities are private. This is clear in the fact that while some
people are outraged when computer applications broadcast their music or
reading choices to the world, others are happy to let Facebook tell their
friends (and perhaps others) about every song they listen to and every
newspaper article they read.33
The simplification inherent in the Standards’ tiers of privacy is thus
likely to be targeted by some critics of the Standards. But I want to begin
this article’s analysis by explaining why, on the whole, such simplification
is not only justified but also probably necessary.
First, law is filled with categorization schemes that necessarily sacrifice
some of life’s complexity in order to provide judges with administrable
rules and make it more likely that the rules will be applied predictably and
consistently. Consider, for example, two areas of constitutional law where
courts have opted to adopt a three- or two-tier scheme instead of trying to
place a person’s liberty or equality interests along a precise point on a
flowing continuum. I have already mentioned one of these above: the
tradition of subjecting government measures that implicate certain First or
Fourteenth Amendment rights to strict, intermediate, or minimal scrutiny.
For example, in Equal Protection contexts, the Court subjects government
classifications based on race or ethnicity to strict scrutiny,34 classifications
33. See Danah Boyd & Eszter Hargittai, Facebook Privacy Settings: Who Cares?, FIRST
MONDAY (Aug. 2, 2010), http://firstmonday.org/article/view/3086/2589.
34. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2003) (“All government racial
classifications must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”); Regents of

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/4

2014]

THIRD PARTY RECORDS PROTECTION

755

based on gender or illegitimacy to intermediate scrutiny,35 and other
classifications to minimal scrutiny.36 Strict scrutiny is the most demanding,
permitting government regulation of a subject only where it can show its
restriction is “necessary” and “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest.”37
Intermediate scrutiny is somewhat more
permissive, allowing regulation even if the government’s interest is
“important” or “significant” rather than a “compelling” interest of the
highest order, and also allowing a less than perfect fit between the
government’s goal and the means it uses to achieve it.38 It requires only a
“substantial” relationship between the two.39 Finally, minimal scrutiny—or
“rational basis”—is the most permissible of the three and leaves the
government with plenty of leeway to regulate, allowing it to do so
whenever it has any “legitimate governmental objective,” even a minor one,
and uses means “rationally related” to that objective, even if the
government regulates far more then necessary.40
In adhering to this three-tier scheme, the Court has rejected occasional
calls for a more nuanced approach—among them Justice Stevens’ claim
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (“Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort
are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.”).
35. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“[C]lassifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives.”); see also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Dual Lives of Rights: The Rhetoric
and Practice of Rights in America, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 296 n.119 (2010) (collecting
cases).
36. See, e.g., Phila. Police & Fire Ass’n for Handicapped Children, Inc. v. City of
Phila., 874 F.2d 156, 163 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that the “general rule” in Equal Protection
Clause analysis is that—except for a few types of government classifications, such as those
based on race or gender—classifications receive only “minimal scrutiny”).
37. See Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422 (2013) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“Under strict scrutiny, all racial classifications are categorically prohibited
unless they are ‘necessary to further a compelling governmental interest’ and ‘narrowly
tailored to that end.’” (quoting Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 514 (2005))); Bakke,
438 U.S. at 299 (stating that, where government is permitted to impose a burden on the
individual under strict scrutiny, the burden must be “precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest”).
38. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (“[C]lassifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.”); Wilkinson, supra note 35, at 296 n.119 (noting that use of such classifications
involves application of “intermediate scrutiny”).
39. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
40. See, e.g., Dunagin v. City of Oxford, Miss., 718 F.2d 738, 753 (5th Cir. 1983)
(holding that under “minimal scrutiny. . . . the classification challenged need only be
rationally related to a legitimate state interest”).
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that the Court should acknowledge that its Equal Protection cases “reflect a
continuum of judgmental responses to differing classifications which have
been explained in opinions by terms ranging from ‘strict scrutiny’ at one
extreme to ‘rational basis’ at the other,”41 and Justice Marshall’s call for a
sliding scale approach which likewise varies according to the
“constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected
and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular
classification is drawn.”42
In the First Amendment context, the Court has likewise opted for
categories instead of continua in public forum doctrine, the strand of free
speech law that bars government from silencing speakers indirectly by
driving them out of streets, parks, or other public space.43 To be sure, the
courts cannot simply prevent government from regulating public space.
Such regulation is necessary to control traffic, protect the environment, and
accomplish numerous other tasks. So the Court has, under “public forum”
doctrine, divided public space into “public forums,” (e.g., streets and parks)
where government’s interests in regulation must often be trumped by
speakers’ interests in free and robust communication,44 and “non-public
forums,”(e.g., airports) where other public interests, like the need for safe
and efficient air travel, trump speakers’ freedom.45
Like the three tiers of scrutiny, the simple categorization in forum
analysis has been challenged.46 Indeed, before settling into the modern
41. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
42. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
43. See, e.g., Sullivan v. City of Augusta, 511 F.3d 16, 46 (1st Cir. 2007) (Lipez, J.,
dissenting) (noting that “access to public spaces to speak on matters of public concern has
long been a concomitant privilege of the right of expression” and this right has included the
right of speakers to use “streets and other public places”).
44. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)
(describing the different types of forums).
45. Lee v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992)
(describing the different categories of forums and concluding that airport terminals “are
nonpublic fora”); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)
(describing the features of different types of forums and finding a fundraiser for federal
employees to be non-public).
46. See, e.g., ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT 199 (1995) (stating that public forum doctrine prevents “sensitive First
Amendment analysis”); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of
Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L.
REV. 1219 (1984).
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public forum approach, the Court hinted it might approach such issues by
simply performing a particularized contextual analysis of each public space
in which the government regulated speech: in each case, it would look at
“[t]he nature of a place” and “the pattern of its normal activities” and ask
whether the speech restricted by the government was “incompatible with
the normal activity of a particular place.”47 Instead of this highly
contextualized inquiry, however, the Court opted to simplify matters. It
categorized public space into two major types—and accorded different
levels of protection to each type. In public forums, speakers’ interests in
use of public space received extraordinary protection. By contrast, in nonpublic forums, speech interests were subordinated to other public needs.
As I have pointed out elsewhere,48 one finds a similar simplification in
the way that current Fourth Amendment law treats the home as opposed to
public space. The home receives extraordinary protection. Police need a
warrant based on probable cause to enter and observe—and this is true even
when the in-home activity they observe is not particularly private. As the
Supreme Court stated in Kyllo, an officer needs to meet this high standard
even when he “barely cracks open the front door and sees nothing but the
nonintimate rug on the vestibule floor.”49 By contrast, police are free to
observe intimate behavior when it takes place in a public setting. Police
might watch, for example, as somebody enters a psychologist’s or
psychiatrist’s office, presumably to inquire about setting up or attending a
medical appointment.50
So, perhaps, the same kind of approach makes sense in the context of
public records. After all, we certainly have some powerful intuitions that
certain records are more private than others. As the Standards Commentary
notes, for example, most people would agree that health records are more
sensitive and merit more protection than utility records.51 Moreover, just as
public forum doctrine deals with competing public interests—in robust
speech, on the one hand, and in other uses of public space, on the other—a
four-level classification of records’ privacy might be seen as dividing the
47. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
48. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Fourth Amendment Future of Public Surveillance
Remote Recording and Other Searches in Public Space, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 21, 41-43 (2013).
49. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).
50. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space:
Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World That Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV.
1349, 1357-58 (2004) (noting that “[a] person usually cannot enter a psychiatrist's office,
marriage counseling center, or infertility clinic except from a public street”).
51. STANDARD 25-4.1 commentary.
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realm of information into different “territories,” in some of which
individuals’ interest in free and unmonitored exploration is paramount, and
in others where law enforcement interests in vigorously finding, and
following, leads is given more weight.
Moreover, while this article later raises some concerns about the
Standards’ proposed factors for assigning categories to each type of
records,52 certain elements of the proposed factors would move records
laws in the right direction. More specifically, some of these factors help
assure that this division of records into “territories” with different levels of
privacy is not simply an arbitrary one. For example, the Standards are
certainly right that privacy becomes more critical when it provides crucial
support for an individual’s ability to engage in “freedom of speech and
association.”53 Where the integrity of certain records is essential to free and
spontaneous discussion or intellectual exploration, then there is a case to be
made that these are records where protection of privacy becomes more
crucial. This is an argument I have made in an earlier work on the privacy
of library or Internet activity.54
It has also received significant discussion in the work of Professor Julie
Cohen and Professor Neil Richards. As Cohen writes, “[C]ompelled
disclosure of information about intellectual consumption threaten[s] rights
of personal integrity and self-definition in subtle but powerful ways . . .
[because] fine-grained observation subtly shapes behavior, expression, and
ultimately identity.”55 Richards writes,
[W]hen the government is listening to our phone calls or
businesses are tracking and analyzing what we read, these
activities menace our processes of cognition and our freedoms of
thought and speech. If we are interested in a free and robust
public debate we must safeguard its wellspring of private
intellectual activity.56
In the twentieth century, such intellectual privacy was largely achieved
in a manner akin to public forum doctrine: by giving individuals an
institutional space—namely, the public library—where strong privacy
52. See infra Part III.
53. STANDARD 25-4.1(a).
54. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Constitutional Safeguards for Silent Experiments in
Living: Libraries, the Right to Read, and a First Amendment Theory for an Unaccompanied
Right to Receive Information, 74 UMKC L. REV. 799 (2006).
55. Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 577 (2003).
56. Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 391 (2008).
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norms allowed them to access all manner of reading materials free from
external observation.57 As BJ Ard writes, the rise of the Internet and digital
reading have undermined this institutional actor-based privacy regime.58
Intellectual privacy in the modern age, he argues, thus requires privacy
protection that applies not just to particular actors (like libraries) but to
reading records with particular content.59 In other words, intellectual
privacy now requires the type of third party protection that the Standards
advocate. In fact, the emphasis that the Standards’ first factor places on
free speech and association in some respects carves up the world of private
information enclaves in a way that is parallel—in both form and purpose—
to the way that public forum doctrine carves up shared public spaces.
Public forums such as parks and streets are set aside for robust debate and
communication of private ideas. They are places where certain other public
interests (such as interests in noise and pollution control) must therefore
take a “back seat” to speech interests. In the law of records protection,
certain channels of informational activity are likewise crucial for another
part of the speech process—namely the private reflection upon, and forging
of, new ideas—and so these too are realms where certain interests, such as
the interest in crime investigations, must be limited enough to leave space
for intellectual freedom.
The other factors offered by the Standards likewise provide sensible
guidelines for marking off certain informational realms as zones of
heightened privacy. Health records, for example, are not by and large
records of our intellectual activity: a record indicating that a medical visit
revealed a heart condition, for example, does not divulge confidential
thoughts or communications. But there are other reasons for treating such
records as “highly private” because while their release might not chill
intellectual exploration or private conversation, it might well do another
kind of harm. In the words of the factors used by the Standards, it might
cause “embarrassment” or “stigma” if released to others in the person’s

57. See Blitz, supra note 54, at 805-07. The protection that the First Amendment
provides for the privacy of one’s home has also provided space for intellectual freedom. As
the Supreme Court wrote in Stanley v. Georgia, under the First Amendment the “State has
no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what
films he may watch.” 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
58. BJ Ard, Confidentiality and the Problem of Third Parties: Protecting Reader
Privacy in the Age of Intermediaries, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 30-45 (2013).
59. Id. at 46.
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community—and may also have other negative consequences (such as loss
of a job).60
To be sure, legislators who simplify the world by artificially dividing it
into three or four categories should take careful account of what they
sacrifice in doing so. In the case of personal records, one might well find
numerous counterexamples to any classification that a legislature proposes.
As the Standards note, the “content of communications” in phone
conversations and e-mails is almost certainly a paradigmatic example of
“highly private” information.61 But anyone can probably remember
numerous phone conversations and e-mail exchanges that lacked any
sensitive details—whether it is small talk with a relative or colleague
revealing nothing of interest about a person’s life, or a call to a coffee shop
or Department Store to confirm the hours it will open. One can likewise
identify certain minimally private records within the generally private realm
of personal health information. People are generally less guarded about a
thumb injury than about a serious illness. Moreover, not only do certain
communications and health records present counterexamples, but certain
individuals do as well. While some people may be horrified at the thought
of alerting strangers to a cancer diagnosis, others may blog about it on a
public website.62
None of these examples, however, seriously undermines the Standards’
classification scheme. In the first place, there is no plausible way for a
legal protection scheme to capture every nuance in individuals’
expectations about privacy protection.
Moreover, this kind of
simplification is often necessary to give people some control over what they
choose to keep private. People are free, for example, to fill their protected
communication space with non-private conversation, and often do. But
high levels of protection at least preserve their option to use it for
confidential communications. In this respect, the records classification
scheme resembles First Amendment public forum jurisprudence. Public
forum doctrine allows individuals to use parks or streets for numerous
activities far more mundane than political debates or religious proselytizing
(such as organizing and playing a game of Frisbee) but always leaves them
with the possibility of having some space from which they can preach to the
60. STANDARD 25-4.1(b).
61. STANDARD 25-4.1(a) commentary.
62. See Eliza Barclay, Why More Patients Should Blog About Illness and Death, NPR
(Mar. 28. 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/03/26/175383540/why-morepatients-should-blog-about-illness-and-death (noting that “while many illness blogs are read
only by friends and family, some patients go more public with their stories”).
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world about their political or religious beliefs or about other topics on
which they wish to communicate with the public.63
If the Standards have a problem, then, it is not that they divide up the
realm of our personal information in a way that entails some simplification,
but rather in how such a necessary simplification is carried out and what
happens after such a division of our informational space is made, when
specific protection mechanisms are put in place for each tier. I will
elaborate upon each of these issues in turn.
II. Rethinking the Factors for Setting Privacy Levels
As teachers at all levels realize, it is often less challenging to come up
with a general grading system (e.g., assigning students an “A”,“B”, “C”,
“D”, or “F”) than it is to figure out which essay deserves which grade. The
same is true here. While some may push for more complexity and nuance
in records’ classification, and perhaps for giving courts a freer hand to
assign records a particular privacy “value,” the Standards can and do make
a strong case for a tier-based system of records classification that runs from
“not private” at the bottom of the list to “highly private” at the top. As the
Standards Commentary recognizes, however, “while people typically agree
on the extremes . . . there are few bright lines in privacy, and there will be
reasoned disagreement in many cases.”64
To help lawmakers and others tackle this disagreement—and perhaps,
their own uncertainty—in an orderly fashion, the Standards propose the
factors discussed above, drawing heavily upon the past privacy law cases,
legislative judgments, and scholarly contributions. It is helpful, at this
juncture, to state them fully in the Standards’ own language. Under
Standard 4.1, when deciding whether
information maintained by third parties . . . [is] highly private,
moderately private, minimally private, or not private, a
legislature, court, or administrative agency should consider
present and developing technology and the extent to which:
(a) the initial transfer of such information to an institutional
third party is reasonably necessary to participate meaningfully in
63. Cf. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2989 n.17 (2010) (finding law school’s nondiscrimination policy
for student organizations, including both religious and Frisbee clubs, followed applicable
limited public forum precedents).
64. STANDARD 25-4.1 commentary.
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society or in commerce, or is socially beneficial, including to
freedom of speech and association;
(b) such information is personal, including the extent to which
it is intimate and likely to cause embarrassment or stigma if
disclosed, and whether outside of the initial transfer to an
institutional third party it is typically disclosed only within one’s
close social network, if at all;
(c) such information is accessible to and accessed by nongovernment persons outside the institutional third party; and
(d) existing law, including the law of privilege, restricts or
allows access to and dissemination of such information or of
comparable information.65
These factors capture a number of important insights and intuitions about
the values that underlie protection of third party information. But like
many other factor-based tests, they risk leaving lawmakers, courts, and
agencies with too little guidance to generate administrable and consistent
legal frameworks. Different lawmakers may well give different weight to
different factors. Indeed, the first two factors above seem to add to this
complexity and unpredictability because each of them is more accurately
understood as a package of factors than a discrete and focused concern.
Factor (a) asks lawmakers to determine (1) whether the information at issue
is the kind that individuals are compelled to share in order to participate in
modern life, (2) whether, even if individuals are free to avoid such sharing,
its dissemination would undermine some social benefit, and (3) whether
such benefits are not merely social benefits, but the safeguarding of First
Amendment freedoms that, unlike other social benefits, the Constitution
places beyond democratic majorities’ capacity to trade for other benefits.66
For some transfers of information, such as telephone conversations, the
answer to all three of these questions might be “yes.”67 But it is also true
that, of the activities required for meaningful participation in life, some are
more beneficial than others, and not all of them might play a significant role
in speech or other First Amendment activity.

65. STANDARD 25-4.1(a) to -4.1(d).
66. STANDARD 25-4.1(a).
67. STANDARD 25-4.1(a) commentary (noting that telephone conversations, as well as email and other electronic communications, further “the freedoms of expression and
association” and are “necessary to participate meaningfully in society and in commerce”).
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Factor (b) likewise asks both (1) whether the information is intimate
information of a sort that will cause emotional shame if released, or (2)
whether it should be considered “personal” simply because individuals’
existing practice tends to show that people tend to treat it as such, and avoid
sharing it, whether because they fear its release will cause shame and
stigma, or for some completely different reason.68
The upshot of these factors’ complexity is that the order and
predictability that the Standards promise with one hand, they at least begin
to retract with the other: They offer an overarching four-tier system for
classifying records’ privacy level but then make the tier designation for
each record depend on a highly contextual factor-based analysis, the result
of which is likely to vary depending on who is applying it. While no legal
framework can avoid some unpredictability in its application, one of the
major reasons that certain judges prefer systems of legal categories rather
than fine-grained contextual judgments is that such systems are more likely
to resist reasoning that is arbitrary, idiosyncratic, or result-oriented.
Consider again First Amendment public forum doctrine: One of the reasons
the Court has adhered to it despite calls for nuance is to keep constitutional
rules from being too easily bent or redefined to accommodate discomfort
with their implications. As Justice Kennedy said in a 1996 case, a more
rule-like approach to the law forces justices to adhere to a rule provided “in
advance” regarding a law’s constitutional validity “rather than letting the
height of the bar be determined by the apparent exigencies of the day.”69
Such a system also provides “notice and fair warning to those who must
predict how the courts will respond to attempts to suppress their speech.”70
As Justice Souter agreed in the same case, “Reviewing speech regulations
under fairly strict categorical rules keeps the starch in the standards for
those moments when the daily politics cries loudest for limiting what may
be said.”71 This doesn’t mean that such strict categorical rules are always
optimal. Perhaps they are less essential in legislation, which can always be
amended, than in constitutional precedent, which legislators cannot override
and judges are hesitant to overrule.
But if there is a way to help guarantee that the Standards’ four-tier
system can provide the order and predictability it promises, then it is worth

68. STANDARD 25-4.1(b).
69. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 785 (1996)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 774 (Souter, J., concurring).
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seeking. Here then is one attempt at simplifying the factors and at leaving
them less of a Rorschach test than they otherwise might be.
The factors seem to be principally focused on counseling legislators to
undertake two major efforts. One is to analyze and understand the gravity
of the harms that flow from certain privacy violations. While the Standards
do not provide a definitive assessment of which harms are the gravest, they
give most sustained attention to the harms that threaten constitutional
interests, such as free speech or the autonomy at the core of substantive due
process. As factor (a) notes, government surveillance—and the risk of
subsequent dissemination—of certain private communications may well
discourage individuals from participating in modern society and commerce,
and may even undercut the intellectual exploration, debate, and association
that the First Amendment is meant to safeguard.72 And as factor (b) notes,
where information concerns intimate activity or is otherwise personal, its
release can cause “embarrassment or stigma.”73 Standard 25-3.3 gives
further emphasis to this concern, noting that the release of a recording can
“chill freedoms of speech, association, and commerce; and deter individuals
from seeking medical, emotional, physical or other assistance for
themselves or others.”74
Rather than simply counseling legislators to reflect generally upon the
social costs (or foregone benefits) that may flow from a lessening of
privacy and to weigh them as they see fit, a slightly amended framework
might provide more guidance. It might ask that lawmakers adopt a
presumption that, where the activity reflected in the information involves a
sphere of activity protected by First Amendment or due process protections,
such records should be classified as “highly private” or “moderately
private,” and that such a presumption should be set aside only when there
are certain powerful reasons that cut the other way. A presumption in favor
of privacy might be overridden, for example, by strong traditions or norms
that treat such information as “non” or “minimally private,” or concrete
evidence that such a classification—and the burdens it imposes on police—
would have grievous effects on their ability to fight crime.
Apart from concerns about privacy harms, the Standards’ factor-based
analysis also dwells (in at least three of the four factors) on a second
concern: that legislators should strive to align their classifications with
individuals’ intuitions and society’s norms about when and where privacy is

72. STANDARD 25-4.1(a).
73. STANDARD 25-4.1(b).
74. STANDARD 25-3.3.
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most necessary. As the Standards Commentary emphasizes, a drafter of
new records law is “not writing on a clean slate.”75 Rather, there are
already social expectations, norms, and rules about privacy, and it makes
sense to craft legal privacy protections that reflect these background
understandings and previous privacy rules. This imperative is already built
into the “Katz” test that courts use to determine what constitutes a search
under the Fourth Amendment—wherein they classify as a search (and thus,
subject to constitutional limits) any governmental investigatory technique
that intrudes upon an “expectation of privacy . . . that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable.”76 Legislators should consider, says factor (b),
whether people seem to treat information as “personal” in that they
“typically disclos[e] [it] only within [their] close social network[s].”77 They
should also consider, under factor (c), whether information about a person
is the kind that people already understand is frequently available to others.78
And they should understand, as factor (d) makes clear, that evidence of
existing privacy expectations is found not only in social norms and
practices, but also in existing law, such as the law of privilege.79 The
Standards Commentary also points lawmakers to other evidence about
intuitions, norms, and practices, such as the survey responses that
Christopher Slobogin and Joel Schumacher obtained from Americans
regarding how they would rank the intrusiveness of different kinds of
government investigatory techniques.80
Of course, apart from examining existing norms, social practices, and
laws, lawmakers also have to decide what to do with such an analysis: in
many cases, the evidence is likely to be inconclusive. Different evidence
will point in different directions. And in the case of new computer
technologies, individuals may not yet have developed strong intuitions or
social norms about its privacy.
One possibility is for lawmakers to adopt a default position that, in the
absence of a clear answer, tilts the scales towards a higher or lower privacy
level. There is at least one strong reason to tilt the scales in favor of lower
75. STANDARD 25-4.1(d) commentary.
76. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
77. STANDARD 25-4.1(b).
78. STANDARD 25-4.1(c).
79. STANDARD 25-4.1(d).
80. STANDARD 25-4.1(b) commentary (citing Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E.
Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment
Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society”, 42
DUKE L.J. 727 (1993)).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014

766

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:747

privacy protection: a presumption the other way might leave law
enforcement with little room for investigating third party information. This
result seems plausible given that, in the discussion of the factors focused
largely on possible harms (factors (a) and (b)), the Standards tentatively
find that most of their examples are likely to count as highly or moderately
private, at least insofar as that particular factor is concerned.81 The content
of individuals’ phone and Internet communications is, of course, central to
speech and central to meaningful participation in modern society. So,
applying the first factor, the Standards find such content to be “more
private.”82 They reach the same conclusion for “information relating to
communication[],” “medical records,” “utility consumption,” “[f]inancial
[a]ccount and [t]ransaction [r]ecords,” IP address information and URLs,
and (more tentatively), “Geographic Vicinity” records.83
The results are more mixed when the Standards’ discussion moves to the
second factor and looks at whether particular categories of records are
“personal.” They emphasize that “some information is more personal than
other information.”84 And among their examples, utility records and IP
address information appear to drop to the lower privacy tiers.85 But here as
well, most of their examples (e.g., communications content and metadata,
financial transaction records, URL address information, and geographic
vicinity information) can plausibly be categorized as personal and often
seem to be regarded as such by survey respondents and others.86 Some of
these categories of records would likely be excluded from the highest rungs
of the privacy classification under my own revised proposal. That proposal
accords a presumption of high privacy only to information, the release of
which would threaten autonomy interests related to free speech, intellectual
exploration, medical treatment, intimate activity, or some other activity in
the zones that our constitutional systems mark off as a realm of individual
autonomy, therefore insulated against government control. Financial
records may receive some privacy protection, for example, but it is less
likely that their release would compromise core speech interests.
In any event, if a consideration of privacy harms tends to err on the side
of placing third party records off-limits to police investigation—until they
obtain a court order based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion—it
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See STANDARD 25-4.1(a) commentary; STANDARD 25-4.1(b) commentary.
STANDARD 25-4.1(a) commentary.
Id.
STANDARD 25-4.1(b) commentary.
Id.
See id.
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may not make sense for inconclusive analyses of social norms and intuition
to err in the same direction. As the Standards note, “[R]ecords searches . . .
are surely one of the most important investigatory activities, and have been
for many years.”87 Phone and Internet records, bank records, and purchase
records can often be essential to giving police a lead to find criminals who
would otherwise evade justice, and “records access has the additional
benefit of not risking a physical confrontation with the target.”88 Moreover,
police need to have some place to begin an investigation.89 In order to
satisfy the probable cause or reasonable suspicion standard, there needs to
be some information they can collect for that purpose beforehand.
Perhaps, then, where the privacy of third party information is not central
to our exercise of speech or other First Amendment rights, and not central
to the personal autonomy we exercise over our bodies and in our bedrooms,
lawmakers should not rush to assume classify it has “highly private” where
social norms and practice point only ambiguously or weakly in that
direction.
To be sure, there are countervailing considerations. As Justice Brandeis
wrote in Olmstead many years ago, even when an investigation is “in aid of
law enforcement. . . . [our] experience should teach us to be most on our
guard to protect liberty when the government’s purposes are beneficent.”90
Such a consideration may favor erring on the side of keeping records
private—and perhaps on the side of assuming that information should retain
a higher level of privacy unless and until powerful evidence is produced
showing that it should be “minimally private” or “not private.” But given
police’s long-standing reliance on records investigations, and the
importance such investigations have for law enforcement’s success,
legislators should be hesitant to apply—to all types of records—a
presumption of high privacy. After all, when Brandeis wrote the abovequoted language, he was not focused on all methods of police investigation,
but rather about wiretapping, searches of “secret papers,” and other
invasions of what he considered core Fourth Amendment liberties.91
A system that disables police—across all types and methods of
surveillance—even when such core interests are not at stake, is unlikely to
87. STANDARD 25-3.2 commentary.
88. Id.
89. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Fourth Amendment Future of Public Surveillance
Remote Recording and Other Searches in Public Space, 63 Am. U. L. REV. 21, 37 (2013).
90. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
91. Id.
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strike a “delicate” and correct balance between law enforcement interests
and privacy.92
To summarize: I propose that the factor analysis might be simplified and
that legislators should at least begin by considering (1) privacy harms and
(2) existing social practices and laws. As they do so, they may adopt a
presumption in favor of treating records related to core First Amendment or
autonomy interests as “highly private” and another presumption that other
records will be minimally private (and thus, accessible without a court
order) unless there is strong evidence that individuals regard and treat
information as moderately or highly private.
This proposal is certain to draw some objections—one of which is that it
overlooks certain important elements of the Standards’ proposed factors
and too quickly subsumes others into the broad categories of “privacy
harms” or “law, social norms, practices revealing privacy level,” when
there are good reasons to consider them independently.
Consider one aspect of the factors I did not discuss above: Apart from
asking whether a records investigation would cause certain types of harms
(e.g., constitutionally significant autonomy interests), the Standards’ first
factor also appears to have another important purpose. It aims to right one
of the wrongs that scholarly commentators—and Supreme Court
dissenters—have long found in the Court’s doctrine. As explained earlier,93
under this doctrine an individual has no constitutionally protected privacy
interest against police investigation of information that she knowingly
shared with third parties. More specifically, the Standards’ first factor
discourages lawmakers from adopting the mistaken assumption—often
found in the third party cases94—that individuals can protect their privacy
by simply keeping the information to themselves. As Stephen Henderson
notes, when the Supreme Court insisted that depositors knowingly share
information with their banks, the Court failed to take into account that “the
92. To be sure, computer technology may, in the future, provide us with an alternative
way of marking the boundary between highly protected information (available only with
probable cause or reasonable suspicion) and information that police can access more quickly
and easily. Rather than distinguishing between more and less private types of records,
legislators might instead require those who keep digital records to distinguish between the
more and less sensitive component of each record. It is possible, for example, for many
categories of records police will be able to satisfy probable cause or reasonable suspicion
with de-identified data, and thus be permitted to connect it to particular individuals only
after satisfying such a threshold. The Standards include a discussion of such a system. See
STANDARD 25-5.6.
93. See supra notes 16-17 an accompanying text.
94. E.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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‘choice’ to convey information to a bank is not voluntary in any meaningful
sense.”95 Indeed, individuals are required to constantly share information
about their activities, including very sensitive information, if they want to
participate in modern society. This was true in the 1970s, when an
individual could not call another person unless they made contact through,
and shared the number they were calling with, a telephone company’s
central office. It is even more true in an age where individuals cannot use a
computer without conveying incredibly sensitive information to Internet
service providers and cannot carry a cell phone without exposing their
physical movements, and phone and Internet activities, to outside
observation.96 The first factor makes clear that the price of life in modern
society should not be a complete sacrifice of privacy. It urges lawmakers to
consider whether “the initial transfer of such information to an institutional
third party is reasonably necessary to participate meaningfully in society or
in commerce.”97
This is certainly an important point, but it is not one that always has
importance in determining a record’s privacy. Some of the information we
use to function in modern life is quite private. This is true, for example, of
the e-mail content and web surfing choices that we share with Internet
service providers.98 The limited (and unavoidable) sharing that makes such
e-mail and web surfing possible should not, as the Standards rightly point
out, make it any less private.
However, this is not true of all information we are forced to share as we
move through modern society. We often have no choice but to share
information about our home address in order to own that property and
receive mail and other services there. This does not mean our home address
is moderately or highly private, and should consequently be unavailable to
law enforcement in the absence of reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
Thus, the fact that we must share information as a condition of life in
modern society shouldn’t weigh against a finding of high privacy, but
neither should it weigh in favor of it. Rather, it is most important as a
95. Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting ThirdParty Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 987 (2007)
(citing Burrows v. Super. Ct. of San Bernardino Cnty., 529 P.2d 590, 596 (Cal. 1974)).
96. Bob Sullivan, Byte Me: How Our Gadgets Track Our Every Move, NBCNEWS.COM
(Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/byte-me-how-our-gadgets-track-ourevery-move-n18621.
97. STANDARD 25-4.1(a).
98. See Lincoln Spector, Is Your ISP Spying on You?, PCWORLD (Sept. 3, 2012), http://
www.pcworld.com/article/261752/is_your_isp_spying_on_you_.html.
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corrective—in those circumstances where lawmakers might otherwise
wrongly assume that by knowingly sharing our information with a third
party (or perhaps sharing it widely with numerous third parties), we have
sacrificed our private interests in it. The Standards rightly point out that
this assumption is a flawed one where our sharing is not truly voluntary, but
rather something that everyone must do simply to live a normal life.99
However, putting emphasis on such a corrective only makes sense in the
situation it is intended to correct. Thus, legislators should avoid beginning
every factor-based analysis of the privacy levels by considering whether
information is of the kind we need to share in order “to participate
meaningfully in society or in commerce.”100 It makes more sense to raise
this point only when it is needed. For example, if existing privacy laws and
social practices seem to indicate that a certain kind of information is widely
shared, legislators might then ask the follow-up question of whether such
information is shared because individuals consider it non-sensitive, or
rather because individuals are compelled to share it whether it is sensitive
or not.
Defenders of the Standards’ current set of factors might also object to
simply treating privilege law (factor (d)) or evidence of sharing with
numerous “non-governmental entities” (factor (c)) as nothing more than
components of a more general analysis about whether information is
currently treated as private. Where information is so sensitive as to be
subject to a legal privilege, one might argue, this should trump evidence of
social practices that points the other way. For example, even if people
often tell friends, family, and acquaintances about what their lawyers said
to them, perhaps the information should still be treated as highly private
when there is a strong attorney-client privilege available in the law for those
who choose not to waive it. Likewise, as the Standards note, where
information that is “personal” and otherwise regarded as private is widely
disseminated to numerous third parties, lawmakers may legitimately ask
why not also allow it to be shared with the police.101 To be sure, it may
make sense to try to structure the way legislators apply each factor by
formulating sub-factors that can guide the application of that factor. They
could, for example, make a list of the types of evidence they will normally
apply to uncover evidence of whether (and to what extent) modern social
practices, legal rules, and expectations treat certain types of information as

99. STANDARD 25-4.1(a).
100. STANDARD 25-4.1(a).
101. STANDARD 25-4.1(b).
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private. But that doesn’t mean that the law of privilege, or evidence of
dissemination to third parties, is so critical to this inquiry that it should have
a separate status. The law of privilege, for example, is intended to protect
sensitive information not against police observation, but against discovery
and possible use at trial by litigation opponents.102
III. An Alternative to Traditional Protection Categories: Another Way to
Frame Law Enforcement Interests
Whereas the Standards provide lawmakers, courts, and agencies with
detailed advice on how to classify a particular record’s level of privacy (as
high, moderate, minimal, or non-private), they provide far less explanation
as to why they match each such level with a particular type of protection
(demands for probable cause, reasonable suspicion, relevance, or no
protection).
This is not surprising. Lawmakers and other legal actors may be
unfamiliar with how to draw the line between “highly private” and
“moderately private” information, for example, because this is not a line
that is familiar in legislation or case law. By contrast, the Standards’
categories of protection are familiar ones. The Constitution itself demands
that government show probable cause to obtain the warrants required under
the Fourth Amendment,103 and courts have struggled for years to define
what probable cause means and demands.104 Since it decided Terry v. Ohio
in 1968, the Court has demanded “reasonable suspicion” in cases (such as
“stop-and-frisk” investigations or “special needs” cases) where they wish to
give police more leeway to investigate certain subjects, but still want them
to remain subject to external constitutional restraint.105

102. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c (2000).
103. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
104. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The requirement of
probable cause has roots that are deep in our history.” (quoting Henry v. United States, 361
U.S. 98, 100 (1959))); United States v. Brinegar, 338 U.S 160, 175 (1949) (stating that
probable cause requires “less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction” but “more
than bare suspicion”); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1924) (defining probable
cause as “reasonable ground for belief of guilt” (citing McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63
(1881))); United States v. Locke, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813) (“It imports a seizure
made under circumstances which warrant suspicion.”).
105. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (holding that to make an investigatory stop, an officer does not
need probable cause and may instead make such a stop when he “observes unusual conduct
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may
be afoot”).
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Christopher Slobogin provides a fuller account of these standards in the
“four-tier” system of protection that he presents in his book, Privacy at
Risk—a system that advocates use of categories of protection quite similar
to those that the Standards set forth for records.106 As Slobogin observes,
“The probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards are well
established and fairly well defined,” with probable cause often being
equated with “a more-likely-than-not (51 percent) finding, or perhaps a
level of certainty somewhat below that” and reasonable suspicion
“associated with approximately a 30 percent level of certainty.”107
Relevance, by contrast is “commonly associated with subpoenas” rather
than court orders, and, as Slobogin explains, generally is used to describe
evidence that has “any tendency to make a fact in issue more probable than
not.”108
These “categories of protection” allow legislators to use an “off the
shelf” solution for records protection rather than trying to begin from
scratch with a system that courts may then take years to refine and that
government officials may struggle to understand.
These categories also play a crucial role in the balance that the Standards
aim to strike between law enforcement needs and individual privacy
interests.
These categories of protection essentially measure the
government-interest side of that balance. The higher a record’s level of
privacy, the stronger the government’s interest must be to obtain it. This
interest is measured by the government’s ability to meet probable cause,
reasonable suspicion, or whatever level of certainty is required—and, for
the two highest tiers of privacy, officials are also faced with the hurdle of
convincing a court, and not just an internal agency official, that the requisite
level of certainty is met.
However, while legislators should certainly take advantage of these
ready-made categories of protection, they should not be confined to them;
there are circumstances in which the law enforcement interests at stake may
not be fully captured by a “level of suspicion” standard. For example, there
may well be circumstances where the government’s interest in seeing a
record is not the kind of interest that will meet probable cause or reasonable
suspicion. Rather, in certain circumstances law enforcement may need to
be free from such a burden. It may need to examine “highly” or

106. SLOBOGIN, supra note 5, at 38.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 39.
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“moderately” private records even when it cannot satisfy the probable cause
or reasonable suspicion standard.
This kind of circumstance is already a familiar one in Fourth
Amendment law’s special needs cases. “Special needs” searches are those
that occur in a setting where “special needs, beyond the normal need for
law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable.”109 In fact, in the special needs context, the Court not only
allows officials to conduct a search without a warrant or probable cause—it
also allows them to conduct a search without any individualized suspicion
of any kind. It allows random drug tests at schools and workplaces,110
sobriety checks of all drivers at a fixed highway checkpoints,111 and
searches of travelers and their belongings at airports.112 As the Court has
noted, such “even-handed blanket” searches are permissible in special
needs searches conducted “outside the criminal context” so long as they are
justified by a “balancing [of] the invasion of privacy [entailed by the
search] against the government’s strong need.”113
As this statement indicates, the “government’s strong need” in this case
is one that is not measured by its ability to satisfy probable cause (or some
lower threshold of individualized suspicion). Rather, it is an interest that
justifies waiving of the normal probable cause or reasonable suspicion
requirement.
In some cases, the Court tolerates blanket searches because the State,
when conducting them, has stepped out of its role as general enforcer of the
laws and into a more limited role in which it is not authorized to jail people
or otherwise subject them to criminal penalties. Where such general
searches are available to authorities in public schools or workplaces, they
are not tools to ferret out and punish crime, but rather tools the State can
use only in its special role of ensuring school or workplace safety and
109. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (quoting Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
110. Id. (schools); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S 602, 619-21 (1989)
(workplaces).
111. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
112. See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 959-60 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding a search
of a traveler at an airport was a reasonable search and noting that administrative searches of
this kind have been upheld on the ground that they serve a “special governmental need,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement”(quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989)).
113. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Andresen v.
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976) (noting that the Fourth Amendment forbids “general,
exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings”).
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discipline.114 In this respect, Fourth Amendment law mirrors First
Amendment law, which allows school principals and government
employers to impose speech limits on students115 and workers116 that would
run afoul of free speech protection if they were imposed by Congress or
state legislatures on citizens more generally. School and workplace
officials may likewise conduct searches of a kind that would violate the
Fourth Amendment if the state tried to conduct them in other contexts.117
But some permissible blanket searches are less clearly outside the
criminal context. For example, if we are stopped at a sobriety checkpoint,
the search we must undergo is conducted by a uniformed police officer, not
a schoolteacher or workplace supervisor. If such a search reveals to the
officer that we are in fact drunk while driving on the highway, we not only
face immediate limits on our driving privileges, but also potential criminal
charges. The same is true at an airport security checkpoint. If a search of
our bag turns up evidence of a weapon, such a discovery might well result
in an arrest and indictment, not simply a refusal to let us board an airplane.
In these cases, the government need that justifies release from the normal
individualized suspicion requirement is not a need that takes place outside
the law enforcement context (to a school or workplace) but rather a need,
which although related to law enforcement, goes beyond “the general
interest in crime control.”118 As the Court has noted, such an extraordinary
law enforcement need may emerge when police set up roadblocks to
“thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is
likely to flee by way of a particular route.”119 These examples would likely
count as the kind of emergency or exigent circumstance in which, the
114. See, e.g., Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666 (“It is clear that the Customs Service’s drug
testing program is not designed to serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement. Test results
may not be used in a criminal prosecution of the employee without the employee's
consent.”).
115. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-72 (1988)
(permitting a principal’s censorship of a school newspaper).
116. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-49 (1983) (permitting an employer
to fire an employee who challenged a transfer and submitted a questionnaire to colleagues
about the transfer policy).
117. E.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-43 (1985).
118. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (noting that law
enforcement may search cars without reasonable suspicion only where their purpose is more
particular than “the general interest in crime control”); see also Blitz, supra note 50, at 145152 (noting that suspicionless searches at airports are used not only to prevent terrorism, but
to apprehend and punish those attempting it).
119. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44 (forbidding police from using a roadblock program to
search for evidence of drug use).
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Standards make clear, police may obtain even a highly private record
pursuant only to “the request of a law enforcement officer or prosecutor,”120
without the need to first obtain authorization from a neutral magistrate. But
not all such extraordinary law enforcement needs fit easily into the category
of emergency or exigency. Routine airport searches, for example, are not
performed only in the face of an expected hijacking. They take place every
day, even in the absence of any terror alerts. Nonetheless, the cost of police
missing such an air travel threat is so high that courts have treated this as an
extraordinary security interest that justifies metal detectors and airport
searches even absent individualized suspicion.121
The Standards also carve out room for such a nonemergency exception to
probable cause or other individualized suspicion requirements. Standard
25-4.2(b) waives them in circumstances where these requirements “would
render law enforcement unable to solve or prevent an unacceptable amount
of otherwise solvable or preventable crime, such that the benefits of
respecting privacy are outweighed by this social cost.”122 A modern-day
Justice Brandeis might well worry that this is precisely the kind of
exception that law enforcement would eagerly broaden to clear away any
privacy protecting hurdles in their way. Where court order requirements
come to seem frustrating, officials might insist to legislators that they
impose high “social cost” and ask for them to be removed. But a more
generous reading of this requirement treats it as a parallel of sorts to the
Fourth Amendment special needs requirement. Like the special needs
cases, it is intended not to sweep away probable cause or other
individualized suspicion requirements, but rather to recognize—and permit
a response to—the reality that the probable cause and individualized
suspicion hurdles that provide invaluable privacy protection in most cases,
might erect insuperable barriers to law enforcement activities in others.
Still, the Standards’ cost-benefit escape clause is framed in worrisomely
broad terms. It is not only in airport searches or other terrorism-related
cases that the police may argue that probable cause requirements constitute
a hindrance with unacceptable “social costs,” but also in many situations
where they are addressing the “general interest in crime control” that the
Court has so far disqualified from special needs treatment. To some extent,
the special needs framework itself presents the same problem: in certain
categories of searches, it allows police to escape the individualized

120. STANDARD 25-5.4.
121. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960-61 (9th Cir. 2007).
122. STANDARD 25-4.2(b).
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suspicion requirement so long as they can argue that “the invasion of
privacy [entailed by the search is outweighed by] the government’s strong
need [for it].”123
This Court’s embrace of such cost-benefit analysis in its special needs
jurisprudence—and the ABA’s embrace of it in Standard 25-4.2(b)—
presents a striking contrast to the treatment that the same type of costbenefit analysis has received in First Amendment cases. In United States v.
Stevens, for example, the government met firm rejection from the Court
when it argued that it should be freed from the normal First Amendment
“strict scrutiny” requirements whenever lower protection was merited,
given a “balancing of the value of the speech [in question] against its
societal costs.”124 The Court responded that such a “free-floating test for
First Amendment coverage” was “startling and dangerous” and reminded
the government that the First Amendment speech protection “does not
extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of
relative social costs and benefits,” but rather extends even to speech many
consider to be of little value.125 To use the previously quoted language of
Justice Souter, the First Amendment’s “strict categorical rules keep[] the
starch in the standards for those moments when the daily politics cries
loudest for limiting what may be said.”126 By contrast, the outcome of a
cost-benefit test would likely be strongly influenced by “daily politics.”
To be sure, the Standards are providing a foundation not for
constitutional rules, but for democratically enacted legislation, where it is
typically more appropriate for decision makers to take account of, and
respond to, what “daily politics cries . . . for.”127 Yet the Standards
themselves seek to prevent this cost-benefit analysis from simply displacing
probable cause and reasonable suspicion requirements. They emphasize
that even if societal costs outweigh privacy benefits and necessitate setting
aside privacy protections, such a measure should preserve as much privacy
as possible: privacy should be compromised only “to the limited extent
necessary to correct this imbalance.”128
123. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 673 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting); see also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976) (stating that the
Fourth Amendment forbids “general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings”).
124. 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010).
125. Id.
126. Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consort., Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 785
(1996) (Souter, J., concurring).
127. Id.
128. STANDARD 25-4.2(b).
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There is, however, a better way of striking the right balance in situations
where probable cause or other suspicion thresholds fail to take adequate
account of law enforcement needs. One finds such an alternative in the
scrutiny-based system used in the First Amendment speech cases, the same
scrutiny-based system that the justices have generally refused to replace
with more “free form” cost-benefit analysis.129
It is useful to explore how a framework modeled on the constitutional
tiers of scrutiny might serve as an alternative to the balancing system that
the Standards currently rely upon—not a full-fledged replacement for the
Standards’ current model, but one that might be used in limited
circumstances where individualized suspicion requirements are
inappropriate.
First, it is helpful to review how strict, intermediate, and minimal
scrutiny work. In general, each level of scrutiny imposes two types of
requirements on government: an ends requirement and a means
requirement.130 The ends requirement demands that the government
objective be justified by an interest of a certain strength. Where the
government restriction threatens harm to core constitutional interests, for
example, and thus triggers strict scrutiny, the government can justify its
action only by showing that its interest is “compelling.”131 When
intermediate scrutiny is the applicable standard, the government interest
must only be “substantial” or “significant.”132 And where the government
is subject to “minimal scrutiny,” any “legitimate government purpose” is
sufficient.133

129. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc., 518 U.S. at 785 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 857 (2014).
131. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2717 (2013) (holding that laws
subject to strict scrutiny must be “‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve a ‘compelling’ government
interest” (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
720 (2007))).
132. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249 (2010)
(stating that to withstand intermediate scrutiny, the government must show that its restriction
“‘directly advanc[es]’ a substantial governmental interest” and is “‘no more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest’” (quoting Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980))); Phelps-Roper v. Koster, 713 F.3d 942, 950 (8th Cir.
2013) (stating that intermediate scrutiny requires, among other things, determining if the
government’s “regulations are ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest’”
(quoting Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester, Mo., 697 F.3d 678 (8th Cir. 2012))).
133. See Schwarz v. Kogan, 132 F.3d 1387, 1390-91 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that in
order to survive rational basis review, or “minimal scrutiny,” a “challenged provision need
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The means requirement goes further in that it demands that even where
government has an interest of the appropriate strength, it still must (at least
in the case of strict and intermediate scrutiny) take steps to minimize the
harm it does to whatever liberty interests are involved.134
Consider, for example, how intermediate scrutiny applies to so-called
“time, place and manner” restrictions on when, where, and how people can
gather for a rally, protest, or otherwise engage in public speech. In these
cases, the intermediate level of scrutiny is designed to strike a balance
between the First Amendment interests of the protesters in free expressions
and the government interests at stake when a protest or parade might disrupt
traffic, or prevent others from using public space.135 Even though
government in such cases, is often trying to protect safety interests and not
trying to suppress a particular category of speech, it still must be regulating
for (1) a sufficiently important reason, and not a minor interest that does not
justify the First Amendment sacrifice it demands, and (2) in a way that
attempts to minimize that First Amendment sacrifice rather than restricting
far more speech than is necessary to fulfill the governments safety, traffic
control, or other interests.136
These elements of time, place, and manner regulation were all
considered by the Court, for example, when it upheld the constitutionality
of a Minnesota regulation that required organizations distributing or selling
literature at the state fair to do so from an authorized “fixed location[]” at a
rented booth.137 The International Society for Krishna Consciousness
(ISKCON), whose members wished to distribute literature in various
locations throughout the fair, challenged the regulation.138 The Court first

only be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose” (citing TRM, Inc. v. United
States, 52 F.3d 941, 945 (11th Cir. 1995))).
134. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 857 (2014).
135. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) (noting that
constitutional protection of civil liberties is not inconsistent with government’s protection of
“social need” such as “control of travel on the streets of cities”); Comite de Jornaleros de
Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 947-48 (applying the time, place,
and matter intermediate scrutiny test to strike down a solicitation that was not narrowly
tailored to the “undisputed” government “duty and responsibility to keep their streets open
and available for movement” (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-555 (1965))).
136. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (noting that
regulations are constitutional when they “are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, . . . are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,
and . . . leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information”).
137. Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 643 (1981).
138. Id. at 644.
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assured itself that the state fair regulation was not aimed at suppressing the
speech of ISKON members or any other speakers. It noted, first, that the
rule itself did not discriminate against any speakers, but rather “applie[d]
evenhandedly to all who wish to distribute [literature] and sell written
materials.”139 Moreover, said the Court, the rules were not only neutral on
their face, but also prevented state officials from engaging in the kind of
“covert” censorship that might result when “arbitrary discretion [to bar
certain speakers but not others] is vested in some governmental
Because “[t]he method of allocating space” was a
authority.”140
“straightforward first come, first served system,” officials could not easily
twist it into a tool for suppressing certain speakers, while allowing others to
roam the fair.141 Had the Minnesota state fair rules flunked this test of
genuine content-neutrality, they would have been subject not to
intermediate scrutiny, but rather to the strict scrutiny that the Court applies
to laws that bar speech on the basis of its content.142
Even though the Court was convinced of the law’s neutrality, its speech
limitation still entailed some threat to First Amendment interest—it limited
the access that ISKON members had to potential audiences and that
interested listeners had to ISKON’s speech. So the government did not
receive unlimited leeway to impose such restrictions. It first needed to
show that it was doing so in furtherance of a significant interest, justifying
the First Amendment sacrifice the government was demanding (the ends
requirement).143 The Supreme Court found its interest in crowd control at
the state fair met this test.144 It also needed to show that it was not limiting
speech much more severely than necessary to achieve this admittedly
important interest, and that it left ample room for ISKON to engage in the
speech in question (the means requirement).145
We might better explain the logic of the Court’s analysis in the line of
time, place, and manner cases with the help of a medical analogy. When a
surgeon is asked to perform a particularly risky operation to preserve a
patient’s life or health, she might first seek to assure that whatever incisions
she has to make near a vital area will not likely cause damage to an

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 649.
Id.
Id.
See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197-98 (1992).
Heffron, 452 U.S. at 649.
Id. at 650.
Id. at 650-51.
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essential organ or physiological function.146 There is after all, little point in
performing a brain operation to improve neurological function, if in doing
so one causes more harm than improvement, for example, by destroying the
hippocampal area necessary for individuals to form memories,147 or by
destroying blood vessels necessary for a person to survive. It is only where
such a risk to life or mental integrity is the only hope for survival, or for
avoiding some other catastrophic fate, that a doctor might, on such a costbenefit analysis, decide it is a risk worth taking. By contrast, if the
surgery—while not risk-free—raises concerns only about other less
essential and central physiological functions, then surgeons whose goal is to
safeguard a patient’s life and health may carry it out even when the
situation is not as desperate. Similarly, where a state’s attempt to protect
citizens’ interest in safety or crime control measures is achieved only by
causing harm to a critical constitutional interest—such as individuals
freedom to hold and communicate the beliefs of their choice—then courts
will allow a state to undertake action that jeopardizes those interests only
where the harm it is addressing is so serious that the state can survive “strict
scrutiny.”
By contrast, where a state’s limit on speech is content-neutral, and thus
does not oppress speech on the basis of its message or meaning, then the
risk to First Amendment values is lower, and the state will have more
leeway to impose the limit. However, the risk to First Amendment interest
still requires that it not do so lightly. Rather, it must still show, under the
Court’s “intermediate scrutiny” standard, that it is addressing a real and
serious problem of the kind that justifies such a sacrifice (the ends
requirement), and that it is doing so in a way that is calculated to avoid
imposing unnecessary harm (the means requirement).148
Where by contrast, a state’s actions do not threaten such a critical
constitutional interest, the Court applies only minimal scrutiny and gives
the government much freer reign.
It does not second-guess the
government’s claim that its regulation is sufficiently important, demanding
146. See Blood Vessel Anomalies – Bleeding in the Brain, NEURO-SURGERY.EU,
http://www.neuro-surgery.eu/EXEN/site/hs-hersenbloeding.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2014)
(noting that certain brain malformations are “so large or difficult to access that surgery
would be impossible without causing significant damage to normal tissue”).
147. See Jenni Ogden, HM: The Man with No Memory: A Neuropsychologist Muses on
Brains, Books and Being Happy, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.psychology
today.com/blog/trouble-in-mind/201201/hm-the-man-no-memory (describing how removal
of a patient’s hippocampus to treat seizures left him with “dense memory loss”).
148. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
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only that the government end be a “legitimate” one (the ends
requirement).149 And as long as the government’s measure is rationally
related to this legitimate end, and not an arbitrary exercise of power, the
Court will not second-guess the government’s methods (the means
requirement).150
It is tempting, perhaps, to treat the categories of protection already used
by the Standards—probable cause, reasonable suspicion, and relevance—as
respectively analogous to strict, intermediate, and minimal scrutiny. But
the analogy is actually a weak one. First, probable cause as a general
matter erects a far less significant hurdle against government action than
does strict scrutiny. As noted earlier, it demands that police have a level of
certainty that exceeds (or perhaps nears) 50 percent probability that the
evidence they are seeking be associated with a crime.151 This is a threshold
police can often meet; they often succeed, after all, in obtaining a warrant
from a neutral magistrate. By contrast, strict scrutiny is, in most cases,
almost impossible for the government to satisfy.
Second, when applying the probable cause requirement, courts generally
do not question the importance of the particular law enforcement interest
that the government is pursuing.152 All the police need to do is show that
they have the requisite level of confidence that the evidence they are
seeking is linked to a crime, whatever its severity.153 To meet strict or
intermediate scrutiny, on the other hand, it is not sufficient for the
government to convince a court that the problem it is addressing is a real
149. See Schwarz v. Kogan, 132 F.3d 1387, 1390-91 (11th Cir. 1998).
150. Id.
151. SLOBOGIN, supra note 5, at 38.
152. See Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment:
Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1, 11 (2011) (“The
various overarching verbal formulations that govern Fourth Amendment doctrine similarly
ignore the wide variance in the public interest in solving different crimes. To detain (or
arrest) a suspect, a police officer must have a reasonable suspicion (or probable cause) that
‘criminal activity is afoot.’” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)). But
see Andrew E. Taslitz, What is Probable Cause, and Why Should We Care?: The Costs,
Benefits, and Meaning of Individualized Suspicion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2012,
at 145, 153 (noting that a minority of courts consider probable cause to be a “variable
standard” depending in part on “the crime’s severity”).
153. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 3.2(a) (5th ed. 2013) (noting that the Supreme Court refused “to adopt a
proposed ‘multifactor balancing test’ for probable cause which ‘would require an officer to
weigh . . . the manner and intensity of the interference, the gravity of the crime involved and
the circumstances attending the encounter’” (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
211 n.14 (1979))).
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one—it must also convince the court that the problem is serious enough to
justify the incursions into the liberty that result from (or are at least risked
by) a speech restriction.154
My proposal here is that, while the Standards’ categories of protection
should continue to be the norm, legislators might apply a framework akin to
scrutiny-based review where the government insists it has a need to be
excused from probable cause requirement or whatever the normal category
of protection would otherwise be.
More specifically, law enforcement might be excused from such
requirements only if it can satisfy (1) an ends requirement that demands, for
example, that the law enforcement need is one that raises extraordinary
concern and (2) a means requirement, demanding that even when law
enforcement is excused from probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or
relevance requirements, it must subject itself to other measures that help
minimize privacy harms.
As noted above, the ends requirement is at odds with the way the Court
has generally decided Fourth Amendment cases. Police need to show
probable cause that the area to be searched or things to be seized are
connected with a crime—not that the crime is a serious one.155 However,
something akin to a serious crime requirement makes more sense when law
enforcement is not attempting to satisfy probable cause (or reasonable
suspicion), but rather seeking to justify being excused from such a
requirement. This, as already explained, is what is typically required in
“special needs” cases, where law enforcement can only engage in
suspicionless searches if they show they are addressing a “special need[],
beyond the normal need for law enforcement.”156 Moreover, even after
officials show that they are addressing a “special need,” they then have to
show that the government interest justifying their search is strong enough to
outweigh the privacy interests it compromises. Emergencies and “exigent
circumstances” might represent one set of circumstances that typically meet
such an ends requirement. But legislators, courts, and agencies might try to
systematically identify others. Rather than simply treating the ends
requirement as satisfied by any objective that a free form analysis leads
lawmakers to believe outweighs the privacy interests on the other side of
154. See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649
(1981).
155. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (finding that probable cause requires
only “that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a
crime” (emphasis added)).
156. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995).
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the balance, lawmakers might think more carefully about what specific
types of government purposes would justify such an exception to the rules,
as courts do when they ask what counts as an interest that is compelling or
significant enough to respectively satisfy strict or intermediate scrutiny.
The means requirement is also significant. It allows legislators to place
hurdles in government’s way that protect privacy even where it is not
feasible to place hurdles of the kind one finds in probable cause or
reasonable suspicion requirements. More specifically, it might allow them
to assure that, even when government demands some sacrifice to our
privacy interests, it will cause as little harm as possible to those interests.
One already finds this kind of “minimization” requirement in certain
areas of Fourth Amendment law. For example, as Susan Freiwald points
out while addressing wiretapping and surreptitious video recording in a
private environment, courts have often demanded even more from police in
these searches than they do for “one-shot physical searches.”157 Rather,
they have imposed a “heightened level of judicial oversight,” which
demands that police not only have good reasons for using such electronic
surveillance, but follow certain procedures when doing so158—procedures
which, in the words of the Supreme Court in Berger v. New York, are
designed to “minimize[]” the “danger” by assuring that “no greater invasion
of privacy was permitted than was necessary under the circumstances.”159
Under Berger, this “minimization” requirement is one of the four
requirements the government must meet to survive Fourth Amendment
review of an eavesdropping request.160 And similar minimization demands
have become a standard part of electronic surveillance law, and other
features of surveillance law, such as the amended version of section 215 of
the USA Patriot Act.161
It has also found a place in the Court’s Fourth Amendment special needs
cases. The Court has emphasized the limited nature of the information
collected and recorded by the government. In Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives’ Ass’n, the Court noted that “chemical analysis of urine, like that
157. Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 3, ¶ 53.
158. Id.
159. 388 U.S. 41, 57 (1967).
160. Id. at 56-57 (finding minimization to be part of the Fourth Amendment requirement
that warrant requests be particularized).
161. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 215, 50 U.S.C. § 1861(g) (2012) (requiring the
Attorney General to “adopt specific minimization procedures governing the retention and
dissemination by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of any tangible things, or information
therein” in foreign intelligence or terrorism investigations governed by the act).
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of blood, can reveal a host of private medical facts about an employee.”162
The Court then went on to observe that “under the [applicable] regulations,”
the government was barred from using the urine and breath tests
administered to railroad workers “as an occasion for inquiring into private
facts unrelated to alcohol or drug use.”163 In National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, the Court likewise emphasized that “urine samples may
be examined only for the specified drugs” and that “[t]he use of samples to
test for any other substances is prohibited.”164 In Vernonia School District
47J v. Acton, the Court made a similar point.165 The information collected
by the drug testing system, it stressed, was hardly a treasure trove of
personal information about a student’s medical condition or past
behavior.166 “[I]t is significant that the tests at issue here look only for
drugs, and not for whether the student is, for example, epileptic, pregnant,
or diabetic. Moreover, the drugs for which the samples are screened are
standard, and do not vary according to the identity of the student.”167
It has also emphasized the limits on who could access the drug testing
information. For example, in Board of Education of Independent School
District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, the Court emphasized that
the drug testing procedures required that “test results be kept in confidential
files separate from a student’s other educational records and released to
school personnel only on a ‘need to know’ basis.”168 The Court also
emphasized (as it had in the other drug testing cases) that the tests “are not
turned over to any law enforcement authority,” and indeed, in Earls itself,
could not even lead to “the imposition of discipline or have any academic
consequences.”169
The same kinds of privacy safeguards have likewise received emphasis
from some of the courts permitting the collection of DNA—and creation of
DNA profiles—from individuals arrested for felonies. Consider, for
example, United States v. Mitchell, in which the Third Circuit held that it
was permissible for the federal government to collect DNA and create
computerized DNA profiles from individuals indicted for (but not convicted

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
Id. at 626.
489 U.S. 656, 673 n.2 (1989).
515 U.S. 646 (1995).
Id. at 658.
Id. at 659 (internal citations omitted).
536 U.S. 822, 833 (2002).
Id.
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of) a felony.170 As courts have done in the special needs cases, the court
observed that the nature of information collected was not nearly as
revealing as an unfettered chemical or biological testing and analysis
regime.171 The DNA sample itself consisted of only a small fraction of the
person’s DNA, containing only thirteen “junk DNA” loci, so-called because
these parts of the DNA apparently do not provide code that shapes our
biology, and thus cannot be used to learn anything about our biological
make-ups.172 The patterns they contained were, like those in a fingerprint,
likely unique to the individual who provided the DNA.173 In this sense,
they are no more revealing than a fingerprint: they just provide some sense
that the person who left his DNA at a particular location had contact with
that place or item.174
The Court also emphasized that it was “reassured by the numerous
protections in place guarding against” government abuse of even the limited
genetic information it had obtained.175 The federal DNA Act allowed the
government to use the sample only for “four limited purposes.”176 It not
only criminalized misuse of the DNA sample itself, but also “the analysis
generated from the sample.”177 And the administrative rules and procedures
applying the Act added a further layer of privacy protections. It permitted
only authorized individuals, approved by the FBI, to receive access to the
170. 652 F.3d 387, 406-16 (3d Cir. 2011).
171. Id. at 400-01.
172. Id. at 400; see also Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The
laboratory creates a profile only for identification purposes by analyzing thirteen genetic
markers known as ‘junk DNA,’ which are not linked to any known genetic traits.”); see also
Transcript of Oral Argument at 10:21-22, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (No.
12-207), 2013 WL 1842092, at *10 (argument of Katherine Winfree for Maryland) (“It’s
looking only at 26 numbers that tell us nothing more about that individual.”). Some
commentators have raised doubts about whether junk DNA is truly lacking in sensitive
medical information. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The
Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 870 (2006) (noting that
“some markers now thought to be meaningless may be (and have been) found to contain
predictive medical information as the science progresses”); Alice Park, Junk DNA—Not So
Useless After All, TIME, Sept. 6, 2012, available at http://healthland.time.com/2012/09/06/
junk-dna-not-so-useless-after-all/ (describing numerous recent studies showing that
“stretches of seeming ‘junk’ DNA are actually the seat of crucial gene-controlling activity”).
173. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 401.
174. Id. at 400-01.
175. Id. at 407.
176. Id. at 408.
177. Id. at 407; see also Haskell, 669 F.3d at 1052 (noting strict limits on use of DNA
information and criminal penalties in California law for violating these limits); Oral
Argument, supra note 172, at 16:7-8 (“The sample cannot be looked at as a matter of law.”).
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“Combined DNA Index System” [or CODIS] where the computer record of
the DNA profile was stored.178 Thus, to the extent DNA collection under
the Act raised graver privacy worries than the more familiar fingerprinting
of arrested individuals, such worries were—in the court’s view—largely
eliminated by statutory and administrative mechanisms which, taken
together, prevented the government from learning any more about an
individual from DNA data than they could from fingerprints.179
This is not to say that such minimization has been demanded. It has
rather been an optional component of the free form balancing test for
special needs cases mentioned earlier, wherein the courts weigh the
government’s interest in a search against the privacy harm it causes. Thus,
in Maryland v. King, the Supreme Court upheld Maryland’s procedures for
taking DNA from arrestees and found it was constitutional because—like
routine fingerprinting of an arrestee—it was an acceptable method of
assuring adequate “identification” of the arrestee, and the Court said little
about the procedural protections in Maryland’s DNA Act.180 The Court has
likewise been willing to let the government dispense—in some special
needs cases—with procedural protection it has emphasized in others.181
However, legislators might require the procedural protections of the kind
the Court has refused to require in the special needs cases. The Standards
already provide some hints as to how lawmakers might do so in the sections
on de-identification, retention and maintenance, and disclosure and
dissemination.
The section on de-identification proposes one “minimization” method
that can, in a sense, be substituted for the normal probable cause,
reasonable suspicion, or relevance requirement. In short, as long as police
adopt procedures and use technologies that strip (and keep out) any
personally identifying information from the records they are examining,
they are free to examine even “highly private” and “moderately private”
178. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 399-400.
179. Id. at 407.
180. 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1976-77 (2013).
181. Compare Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 661 n.1 (1989)
(noting that under HHS regulations an employee is required to provide prescription
information “only after he is notified that his specimen tested positive for illicit drugs, at
which time the Medical Review Officer reviews all records made available by the employee
to determine whether the positive indication could have been caused by lawful use of
drugs”), with Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 659 (1995) (finding no
problem where the school required students to submit prescription information “in advance”
of the test and allowed the information to be seen by school officials and not simply medical
personnel).
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records without meeting any kind of individualized suspicion.182 All that is
needed in such a case is an “official certification” from the agency.183 Of
course, this de-identification rule is not intended to provide an end run
around the normal court order requirement. If police wish to reconnect this
de-identified data to any identifiable individual, they must first obtain the
authorization that would normally be required for that type of data, given its
level of privacy (i.e., highly, moderately, or minimally private).184
The section on retention and maintenance likewise demands protections
paralleling, in many respects, the privacy protection measure I discussed
above in the Federal DNA Act.185 It requires among other things, that
legislation protect against “unauthorized access”186 and place limits on the
personnel who have the required authorization, and that “[m]oderately and
highly protected” records should be “subject to audit logs recording all
attempted and successful access” and “destroyed according to an
The section on disclosure bars further
established schedule.”187
dissemination of the records police require, except for enumerated
purposes, such as for purposes of the case the police are investigating, or in
certain “other government investigations, or parallel civil investigations.”188
For example, even when records are not de-identified, courts might
demand that police find a way to minimize the amount of unnecessary
information they obtain or, by subjecting the information first to certain
algorithms in computers, the amount of information that any human views.
After all, it is arguably not as invasive to have our data subjected to
machine analysis as it is to have it subjected to analysis by a person. Just as
wiretaps might meet minimization requirements, so too might third party
record searches.
Alternatively, courts might allow police to use certain highly or
moderately private data that they analyze only to address problems of a
limited kind. This kind of limit combines the ends and means components
of scrutiny-based review. Police might be barred, for example, from
obtaining DNA records used to provide evidence of serious criminal
activity and then repurposing them to investigate a less serious offense.

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

STANDARD 25-5.6.
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 170-179.
STANDARD 25-6.1(a)(i).
STANDARD 25-6.1(b).
STANDARD 25-6.2.
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In any event, my central point here is that apart from simply relying on
the familiar categories of protection one finds in the probable cause,
reasonable suspicion, and relevance standards, and then supplementing
them with limited use and disclosure protections, the Standards’ writers
(and the legislators who follow their lead) could build upon the important
work they began in setting forth such use and disclosure requirements and
shape them into more robust means requirements, akin to those courts use
in constitutional scrutiny-based review.
Conclusion
In her concurring opinion in United States v. Jones, Justice Sotomayor
wrote that in light of modern technological developments, “it may be
necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third
parties.”189 Consequently, just as the Supreme Court in Katz v. United
States decided to heed Justice Brandeis’s call forty years earlier to make
wiretapping a subject of Fourth Amendment protection, it may, as Justice
Sotomayor indicates, turn more than eighty years later to Justice Brandeis’s
prophetic worry that future technologies would pull “secret papers” out of
well-guarded drawers and store them instead in places where they are easier
for government to access on a whim, such as today’s electronic, third party
owned servers.
However, until that time comes, legislators can move to fill the gap, and
the Standards can provide these legislators with an admirable template on
which to do so. The Standards provide an appealing, orderly framework for
protecting the vast territory of third party information, and rather than
focusing single-mindedly on individuals’ privacy interests, instead attend to
“the critical need for striking the delicate balance between law
enforcement’s legitimate need for access to such records and the privacy
rights of the subjects of those records.”190
My point in this article has been that while the Standards have
understandably turned legal thinkers’ attention from constitutional law
questions to legislation, it would be good for legislators to keep in mind—
as they apply and elaborate upon the Standards’ invaluable framework—
that they might add to this framework by continuing to think about realms
of constitutional law outside of the Fourth Amendment. In particular,
courts’ long-standing jurisprudence on heightened scrutiny might provide
189. 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
190. LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 5, at 16.
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important guidance both on what sphere of informational lives deserve the
strongest (default) privacy protections and on the form that those
protections should take when it is important to give government some
access to crucial investigation-related information while continuing to
minimize the damage they do to privacy interests.
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